Populist Manipulation or Personal Beliefs? A Study of the Divergent Perceptions of the Social Order in Switzerland by Abrassart, Aurélien & Wolter, Stefan C.
Universität	Zürich	IBW	–	Institut	für	Betriebswirtschaftslehre	
Working Paper No. 156 
 
Populist Manipulation or Personal Beliefs? 
A Study of the Divergent Perceptions of the 
Social Order in Switzerland  
   
Aurélien Abrassart and Stefan C. Wolter 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.
or
g/
10
.7
89
2/
bo
ri
s.
13
86
26
 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
16
.3
.2
02
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 February 2019 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des 
Leading Houses und seiner Konferenzen und Workshops. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der 
Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des Leading House dar. 
 
Disussion Papers are intended to make results of the Leading House research or its conferences and workshops 
promptly available to other economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The 
authors are solely responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Leading 
House. 
 
 
The Swiss Leading House on Economics of Education, Firm Behavior and Training Policies is a Research 
Program of the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research, and Innovation (SERI). 
 
www.economics-of-education.ch 
Working Paper No. 156 
 
Populist Manipulation or Personal Beliefs? 
A Study of the Divergent Perceptions of the 
Social Order in Switzerland 
  
Aurélien Abrassart and Stefan C. Wolter  
 
 1/34 
Populist Manipulation or Personal Beliefs? A Study of the Divergent Perceptions 
of the Social Order in Switzerland 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Because of an important consistency in the prestige ratings of occupations from respondents 
across various social groups, countries and over time, the roots of divergent perceptions of the 
social order have attracted little attention. Yet structural changes in modern economies, brought 
by rapid globalization and technological change, and the rise of populism might have triggered 
a growing contestation of the foundations of the social order. We contribute to this important 
question by analyzing a unique data set in Switzerland based on a survey of adults’ perception 
of the social prestige of occupations. As our results indicate, identification with major or minor 
right-wing populist parties does not significantly influence one’s view of the social world. Ra-
ther, a radicalization of individual belief systems is the cause of the lower impact of the educa-
tional requirements and salience in autonomy of occupations on their perceived social prestige.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Autonomy, educational requirements, occupational prestige ranking, political radi-
calization, populism, social order. 
Funding: This work was supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and 
Innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
The social prestige of occupations, through the symbolic power and deference it pro-
duces, has been argued to play a key role in the stability of the political and economic systems 
(Bourdieu 1985; Weber 1946; see also Corneo and Grüner 2002, for a test of the effect of the 
prestige of income categories on attitudes towards redistribution, and Cutler 1973, for the in-
fluence of the perceived social prestige of older individuals on the political support for the 
aged). As Weber (1946) suggested, social prestige may be “the basis of political or economic 
power, and very frequently has been” (p. 180). 
Research on occupational prestige ranking culminated with the well-known consensus 
that prestige ratings are highly consistent across social groups and have remained so over time 
(Blau and Duncan 1967; Balkwell, Bates and Garbin 1980; Hodge, Siegel and Rossi 1964; 
Hodge, Treiman and Rossi 1966; Treiman 1977). Against this background, one was left to won-
der whether prestige ratings are simply “peculiarly collective perceptions of social reality rather 
than expressions of personal values,” as stated by Treiman (1977:59). More recent develop-
ments, however, indicate some notable individual differences in occupational prestige ranking. 
More particularly, respondents who are the furthest from the centers of power because of their 
education, ethnicity or gender, are less consistent in their ratings and less likely to acknowledge 
the rational bases of the social order that are the knowledge and authority components of occu-
pations (Guppy and Goyder 1984; Lynn and Ellerbach 2017; Zhou 2005). The causal mecha-
nism linking the distance to the centers of power and the cognitive mapping of occupations 
according to their social prestige remains, however, vague.  
The growing influence of populist parties on the political life in many developed coun-
tries has been shown to pose a threat to the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions (e.g. 
Foa and Mounk 2017). Challenging the legitimacy of these institutions could in turn undermine 
the basis of the social prestige of occupations and further contribute to the political instability 
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observed. In addition, political attitudes might well be an important determinant of the percep-
tion of the prestige of occupations (Villemez 1976; Young and Willmott 1956). Through the 
formation of political attitudes, individuals learn to value occupations according to criteria 
linked to their personal belief system (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983; Lamont 2012). Accord-
ingly, this paper addresses the question whether alternative views of the social world are the 
direct result of the political manipulation of the social reality by populist representatives or 
whether they are predominantly influenced by the inherent belief systems of individuals.  
To answer this important question, we analyze a unique data set from an original survey 
of educational preferences and occupational prestige ranking in Switzerland. Switzerland is 
generally characterised by an anti-elitist political culture that finds its sources both in the par-
ticularities of its political system, notably in the form of direct democracy, and in the emergence 
and pre-eminence of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the populist right-wing party (PRWP) 
with the most seats in the national parliament. The polarization of Swiss politics, in particular 
the rise in power of the SVP and their anti-elitist stance, has led to a political climate where the 
usual consociational view of the social world is increasingly being challenged by conflictual 
opinions (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015; Bornschier 2015; Häusermann, Mach and Papado-
poulos 2004; Vatter 2016).  
Against this background, we test in this paper whether an anti-elitist political climate 
can lead to a lower likelihood of recognition of the rational bases of the traditional social order 
or whether deviant occupational prestige rankings are rather caused by radical or extreme po-
litical belief systems. To do so, we first review the corresponding literature, before, in a second 
stage, introducing our data and the methodology. We then present descriptive statistics in a third 
part and discuss our statistical analyses in a fourth section. Finally, in the fifth and last section, 
we conclude and discuss the implications of our findings as well as the limits of our study. 
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2. Theory 
2.1. Consensus vs. dissensus in occupational prestige ranking 
An important strand in the early sociological literature argued that prestige ratings of 
occupations remained consistent across social groups, countries and over time (Blau and Dun-
can 1967; Balkwell, Bates and Garbin 1980; Hodge, Siegel and Rossi 1964; Hodge, Treiman 
and Rossi 1966; Treiman 1977). Because of this consensus, perceptions of the social order de-
viating from the norm were mostly ignored. As a result, we still know little about the formation 
of divergent perceptions of the social prestige of occupations. As Lamont notes (2012), the 
logics of valuation and evaluation of the social world are numerous and greatly influence the 
cognitive lens through which individuals perceive the social order and prestige of occupations.  
Research has repeatedly provided evidence of a lower consistency in the prestige ratings 
of lower strata groups, such as low-educated individuals, blue-collar workers and minority 
groups (Guppy and Goyder 1984; Lynn and Ellerbach 2017; Zhou 2005). According to Guppy 
and Goyder (1984:721), the main reason lies in the “cross-pressures of reconciling economic 
reality with the need to protect ego” that result from competing ideologies in industrial and 
post-industrial societies. Accordingly, unless the dominant ideology is pervasive enough to 
achieve complete indoctrination, lower strata individuals are less likely to exhibit consistency 
in their ratings (Guppy and Goyder 1982). Following a lack of exposure to strongly socializing 
institutions, lower strata individuals might turn to competing ideologies to resolve the afore-
mentioned cross-pressures and provide them with alternative explanations to the harshness of 
the economic reality they experience. As argued, for instance, by Lamont (2012), “a less highly 
institutionalized field will be less consistent in providing clear rules and in socializing newcom-
ers (as compared with, say, a higher education system that trains newcomers for several years)” 
(p. 212). Instead of recognizing the science and authority components or training intensiveness 
of occupations as the natural bases of the social order as are doing highly educated workers, 
lower strata groups thus rely on other schemata than the ones provided through the education 
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system. As we posit next, the lack of socializing context could, in turn, be at the root of a radi-
calization of the belief system of individuals that leads them to develop alternative views of the 
social world. 
 
2.2. Belief system and political orientation 
As highlighted by Young and Willmott (1956), and later Villemez (1976), respondents 
exhibiting a deviant logic of occupational prestige ranking from the dominant view were also 
characterized by distinct political attitudes and distributive beliefs. A more precise account of 
the causal mechanisms involved in the context of one’s confrontation with the categorization 
of the social world is given by Boltanski and Thévenot (1983). As the authors argue, the ranking 
of occupations other than one’s own occupation is realized simultaneously to one’s own posi-
tioning in the social order in relation to the other external categories. Respondents thus never 
remain neutral or passive in the process of occupational prestige ranking. More importantly, 
their relation to the dominant view will differ depending on their own position: “the dominant 
representation may be familiar, and recognised as dominant, but need not nevertheless be ac-
cepted as "accurate", or it may become the object of complex strategies containing a mixture of 
recognition and refusal, acceptance and rejection” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983:651). In other 
words, conformity to the dominant view will occur only in those cases when individuals “them-
selves occupy a dominant position within the category […] or when they are completely outside 
the category and do not feel personally implicated in the task they are asked to perform” 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1983:651). By contrast, a subordinated position is likely to lead to a 
rejection of the dominant view, as individuals become aware of it. As such, all individuals ex-
press their relation to the dominant view of the social order depending on the perception of their 
position in it. This stand can be moral (e.g. in the distinction between the public and private 
sector) or reflect more complex belief systems among individuals. 
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The nature of belief systems can vary strongly, whether across countries, for instance 
because of value differences (e.g., MacKinnon and Langford 1994), across social strata as a 
result of different socialization processes (see, e.g., Lauer 1974, for differences between Cath-
olic and public school pupils), or following changes in the character of central objects in a belief 
system (Converse 2006). As aptly put by Converse (2006:10-11), these objects “shift from the 
remote, generic, and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or "close to home." Where 
potential political objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract, "ideologi-
cal" principles to the more obviously recognizable social groupings or charismatic leaders and 
finally to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates.” At 
the political level, lower social strata are, accordingly, more likely to rely on concrete thinking 
since political subjects that are not directly relatable are perceived as too remote or abstract.  
Yet it would be wrong to reduce ideology to political sophistication, as the left-right 
dimension has been shown to be pervasive in many life domains and to result from various 
psychological needs, motives and constraints (Jost, Nosek and Gosing 2008). In addition, ac-
cording to Sartori (1969:400), ideology “indicates a particular state, or structure, of political 
belief systems”. Core beliefs and values about society have indeed been shown to be embodied 
in the political orientation of individuals (Caprara et al. 2006; Feldman 1988; Goren 2001; 
Knutsen 1995). Thus, the political orientation of individuals might alter their view of the social 
world through the understanding of the concept of social prestige and the perception of the 
desirability and the value of each occupation for society. More precisely, moving away from 
the centre of the political spectrum toward either extreme is expected to lead to a lower likeli-
hood of acknowledging the rational bases of the social order. This is because individuals subject 
to a radicalization of political views are more likely to have adopted political belief systems 
that reject the dominant view and its institutional foundations. 
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As has been shown in other studies of occupational prestige ranking, the educational 
requirements or the training intensiveness of occupations is determinant for their perceived so-
cial prestige (Abrassart and Wolter forthcoming; Lynn and Ellerbach 2017; Zhou 2005). In 
Switzerland, the educational system is the main foundation of the social order because of its 
highly stratified feature and its strong link to the labour market that generate important social 
boundaries at the occupational level (Buchmann et al. 2016; Buchmann and Sacchi 1998). 
Against this background, we can put our first hypothesis forward: 
 
H1: the further from the centre of the political spectrum one is, the lower the likelihood of 
attributing a higher social prestige to occupations requiring a higher level of education to be 
performed, all other things being equal. 
 
By contrast, we posit that the political distance to the dominant view is associated with 
a lower likelihood of attributing occupations salient in physical/manual and routine tasks a 
lower social prestige. As explained beforehand, lower social strata are expected to rely more on 
concrete thinking while assessing political objects. As we argue here, the same reasoning can 
be applied to the perception of the social prestige of occupations. The purpose of occupations, 
when abstract, is therefore probably less intelligible for lower social strata whose belief system 
is rather built on concrete cognition than theoretical concepts. Depending on their orientation, 
whether left or right, they might, however, do so because of different reasons. At the far left, 
the dignity of manual labour should be at the centre of respondents’ values and beliefs. Accord-
ing for instance to Penn (1975:356-357) comparing the value systems of Czechoslovakia, Po-
land and the U.S. to understand cross-country differences in the attribution of social prestige, 
the Czechoslovakian respondents had “internalized the values of socialism with its special em-
phasis on the dignity and worthiness of manual work which is based upon the underlying Marx-
ist philosophical assumption that the industrial proletariat are the universal, revolutionary class 
 
 8/34 
that will destroy bourgeois capitalist society and build a new, liberated communist social struc-
ture”. At the far right, manual labour conveying more conservative values such as hard work 
and traditionalism will be at the core of their belief system.  
 
H2a: the further from the centre of the political spectrum one is, the lower the likelihood of 
attributing a lower social prestige to occupations salient in manual and knowledge-poor tasks, 
all other things being equal. 
 
Finally, job autonomy is expected to be valued differently depending on individuals’ 
political preferences. First, job autonomy appears to be highly valued by social and cultural 
specialists who are more likely to find the cultural progressivism of the New Left attractive and 
therefore position themselves at the centre-left (Güveli, Need and de Graaf 2007). Second, we 
expect respondents at the centre-right of the political spectrum to also value autonomy at the 
workplace. This is because they should be traditionally attached to work values that emphasize 
individual freedom and responsibility while rejecting constraining collective security arrange-
ments (Jansen 2016). At both extremes of the political spectrum, however, the picture appears 
less clear. At the far left, despite the lack of autonomy at work contributing to individuals’ de-
humanization and objectification and being thus regarded as detrimental according to the Marx-
ist tradition (Volpato, Andrighetto and Baldissarri 2017), we expect social conformity, as op-
posed to personal autonomy, to prevail and to be seen as more important for the societal well-
being. At the far right, social conformity, which is understood as the exclusion of specific groups 
and manifests itself in a lack of tolerance for diversity and individual autonomy, should also be 
predominant (Feldman 2003; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Against this background, we put the 
following hypothesis forward: 
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H2b: the further from the centre of the political spectrum one is, the lower the likelihood of 
attributing a higher social prestige to occupations salient in autonomy, all other things being 
equal. 
 
2.3. Political representation 
As argued by Bourdieu (1985), it is essentially at the political level that the struggle for 
power and domination takes place, and in turn influences the structure of the status order and 
the nature of the social world through the various social categories created by the political 
power. The political level is thereby the central challenging site of the symbolic production of 
the social world based on the representation of the occupational field of the dominated. More 
precisely, political representation occurs through organized bodies that operate mostly through 
symbolism and the creation of distinctions using language. As Bourdieu (1985) claims, “The 
spokesperson, in speaking of a group, on behalf of a group, surreptitiously posits the existence 
of the group in question, institutes the group, through the magical operation that is inherent in 
any act of naming” (p. 741). Adhering to the political discourse of a given representational body 
is a sign of acceptance and incorporation of the distinctions and groups that were created 
through that said discourse. Thereby, expressing one’s preferences for a given body will likely 
shape the perception of the social prestige of the occupations that are represented and targeted, 
positively or negatively, in the political discourse. 
The recent rise of populism in many liberal democracies is, in that regard, particularly 
worrisome, as the associated political discourse is likely to change the perception of the social 
world for those who adhere to it. Because of the presence of antagonistic schemas dividing 
society between the people and the elite on the discursive and symbolic level, political repre-
sentation of populist views is therefore expected to lead to a challenging of the social structure 
in place (Katsambekis 2017). Instead of realizing a transformation of the social world by en-
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couraging and supporting social change among its constituency, populists rather act on the per-
ception of the social status of the people they represent (Mudde 2004)1.  
This symbolic contestation of the social order on the political level often contrasts with 
the more technocratic exercise of power from governing parties that tend to lose their ideolog-
ical stance and experience a convergence in the policies they defend and implement. Whereas 
populism stresses “the centrality of a putative will of the people in guiding political action”, 
technocracy insists on “the centrality of rational speculation in identifying both the goals of a 
society and the means to implement them” (Carmani 2017: p. 54). As further noted by Caramani 
(2017: p. 62), populism and technocracy differ from party government in that they don’t con-
sider the plurality of interests for the elaboration and implementation of policies, but “rely on 
other mechanisms for the identification of the objective and comprehensive interest of society”. 
While technocracy emphasizes the role of education, knowledge and expertise for the decision-
making process, the proximity between the representatives and the represented and the absence 
of a clear hierarchization of the social world predominate in the populist view, whereby one 
belongs to the people or is excluded from it (Caramani 2017; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). The 
anti-elitist or anti-establishment characteristic of populism is not only targeted towards the po-
litical elites, but also the media, the state, intellectuals or economic powers (Jagers and Wal-
grave 2007).  
This anti-elitist stance is particularly acute among the major PRWP in Switzerland, the 
SVP (Ernst, Engesser and Esser 2017), although the kind of populism they endorse is rather 
cultural than economic in comparison to other PRWPs (Bernhard 2017). Because the SVP takes 
an explicitly anti-elitist stance, we expect people expressing a preference for this party to be 
less likely to attribute a higher social prestige to occupations requiring academic higher educa-
tion. Furthermore, because other more radical PRWPs in Switzerland are much less liberal with 
regards to economic issues in addition to the cultural aspect, respondents expressing a prefer-
ence for these parties should even further reject the main foundations of the social order. 
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H3a: Respondents choosing the Swiss People’s Party are less likely to attribute a higher social 
prestige to occupations requiring a higher level of education to be performed than centrist par-
ties, all other things being equal. 
 
H3b: Respondents choosing other, more radical PRWPs are less likely to attribute a higher 
social prestige to occupations requiring a higher level of education to be performed than the 
SVP and centrist parties, all other things being equal. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Presentation of the data 
We contribute to the literature by analyzing a unique data set in Switzerland based on 
an original survey (2015) of 6,262 adult residents’ perception of the social prestige of occupa-
tions2. In this survey, four random samples of almost equal size and similar composition were 
presented with ten occupations that were chosen based on their representativeness and their 
educational requirements in older surveys in terms of ranking. They were then asked to rank a 
list of occupations according to their social prestige as follows: 
 
“10 distinct occupations are listed below. How do you assess the social prestige of these occu-
pations? Rank to this end the listed occupations from 1 (= this occupation has the highest so-
cial prestige) to 10 (= this occupation has the lowest prestige).” 
 
By contrast to other studies investigating prestige ratings in place of ranking, as we do 
here, respondents are forced to compare occupations against one another based on specific pre-
established dimensions, instead of comparing all items “against an external set of criteria (e.g., 
originality, significance)” (Lamont 2012:211). As such, respondents need to carefully establish 
 
 12/34 
a hierarchy and assess the relative prestige occupations, rather than the absolute prestige. The 
ranking, therefore, reflects more the perception of the social order than the intrinsic perceived 
value of each individual occupation.  
The list of occupations presented to respondents differed according to the sample (Table 
1). As compared to the first sample, occupations with lower educational requirements (up to 16 
years of education in average, highlighted in grey) were replaced by five alternative occupations 
with similar educational requirements in the second sample; the five occupations requiring 
higher levels of education to be performed (from 16 to 22 years of education, in white) remain-
ing the same. Conversely, the third sample differed from the first in that the five occupations 
with higher educational requirements were replaced by five alternative occupations with similar 
educational requirements, whereas the five occupations requiring lower levels of education 
were the same in both samples. Finally, the fourth sample combines the five alternative occu-
pations requiring lower levels of education from the second sample and the five alternative 
occupations requiring higher levels of education from the third sample. Because the differences 
in the framing of the list of occupations across the samples are of no interest for our research 
questions, the four samples were pooled and controlled for in the analysis. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Because some respondents assigned the same ranking to distinct occupations more than 
once, we run the main analyses after dropping the cases where the same rank was given more 
than once to several occupations. After the plausibility analysis and the exclusion of missings 
in our independent variables, a maximum of 5,030 respondents remained in our main sample, 
each one ranking ten distinct occupations (ties were excluded)3. 
 
3.2. Specification of the statistical model 
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We apply a rank-ordered logit model (also known as exploded logit model) by maximum 
likelihood estimation to analyze variation in our dependent variable. The rank-ordered logit 
model applied to our data estimates the likelihood of attributing an occupation i the rank j, 
conditional on a set of variables at the occupational level. The basic model assumes that all 
respondents have the same probability distribution of occupation preferences and that individ-
ual variation in the ranking only results from random variation (Allison and Christakis 1994). 
By interacting variables at the occupational and individual level (cross-level interactions), we 
test whether some of the heterogeneity in the ranking across respondents can be attributable to 
measured variables. 
Following Allison and Christakis (1994), the model can be formally expressed as fol-
lows:  
𝜇𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖 +  𝛾𝑧𝑗 +  𝜃𝑤𝑖𝑗 
where 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is the rank assigned by respondent i to occupation j; 𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑗, and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 are column vectors 
of the observed variables, respectively, at the individual level, occupational level, and across 
levels; and 𝛽𝑗, γ and θ are row vectors of the coefficients we wish to estimate. In the specifica-
tion where only occupation-level variables are introduced, the model is simplified: 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾𝑧𝑗 
where 𝑧𝑗 stands for the variables that vary across occupations but remain identical for all re-
spondents. Only a maximum of nineteen (20 occupations − 1) can be included in the model to 
avoid linear dependence. In our specification of the model, building on the previous one, we 
add interactions between the occupation-level variables and covariates at the level of the re-
spondents: 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾𝑧𝑗 +  𝜃𝑤𝑖𝑗 
where, here, the 𝑤𝑖𝑗 vector stands for the interactions between the 𝑥𝑖 and the 𝑧𝑗 variables.  
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3.3. Independent and control variables 
At the occupational level, our first independent variable consists of the educational re-
quirements of an occupation, or its training intensiveness, that we measure through the average 
years of education of the workers in each occupational group4. This factor has been shown in 
various studies to be one of the most important bases of the perception of the social order, 
although important individual variation in the effect of this variable exists (Lynn and Ellerbach 
2017; Zhou 2005). The level of the educational qualifications required partially reflects the 
training intensiveness of occupations, especially in Switzerland where the link between the ed-
ucation system and labor market is strong (Buchmann and Sacchi 1998; Buchmann et al. 2016). 
The maximum number of years required to graduate for occupations accessed through voca-
tional education was retrieved from the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innova-
tion professional register. This was done in order to avoid including respondents in an occupa-
tional group that had higher qualifications than the nationally defined value. 
Other independent variables include a set of indicators on skill content at the EU-15 and 
US level (ISCO-08 2-digit). These indices were retrieved from Eurofound (2016) and con-
structed from variables included in the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), 
PIAAC, and Occupational Information Network data set data that were standardized and used 
to extract scores for each occupation–sector combination5. Next, we assigned the resulting in-
dices obtained for each category of the ISCO-08 2-digit6 classification to the occupations in-
cluded in the present analysis7. We selected, more particularly, the following indices of skill 
demand and content based on their relevance for our research question: - strength: task involving the exertion of energy and strength; - problem-solving: finding solutions to complex and new issues; - autonomy: self-direction and latitude. 
 
Control variables at the occupational level include the standard errors of the average 
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years of education, the size of the occupational group as the number of workers in thousands 
(including a quadratic term to consider the non-linear effect), and the proportion of migrants 
and women in each occupational group (also as a non-linear effect). The previous control 
variables at the occupational level were generated using the Swiss Labour Force Survey and 
sampling weights8. Here, these variables are mostly used to account for the effect of social 
closure, in the sense of Weeden (2002), on occupational prestige ranking, whereby the size, 
composition (both in terms of average level and homogeneity) of the various occupational 
groups are expected to positively influence the ranking of occupations according to their social 
prestige (see Table A1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics). 
At the individual level, our independent variables encompass: - the political orientation: 1-10 (1 being far left, 10 being far right); - the political party respondents would most likely vote for at the next election (see Tables 
A2-3 for descriptive statistics). 
 
Party preference was recoded so that the original categories, that is, all parties then rep-
resented in the Swiss parliament, were simplified and better adapted to our research question. 
The four categories of the recoded variable are now:  
a) The left and centre-right, including the Social Democrats (SP), the Greens (Grüne), the 
Christian Democrats (CVP/EVP), the Liberals (FDP), the Green Liberals (GLP), and the 
Conservatives (BDP).  This simplification is justified by the fact that these parties, despite 
representing very distinct political interests, are in comparison to the SVP and other PRWPs 
not populist in the anti-elitist sense of the term (although they might exhibit some people-
centrism, see, e.g., Bernhard [2017] or Ernst et al. [2017]) and less likely to contest the 
social order according to the educational requirements of occupations9. Furthermore, a more 
detailed operationalization, whereby each party was included individually in the model, did 
not affect our main findings (results available upon request).  
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b) SVP.  
c) Other PRWPs.  
d) Other parties.  
 
In the statistical models, party preference was not included when the variable of interest 
was the political orientation to avoid any bad control issues. However, when party preference 
was included as our variable of interest, we controlled for political orientation. Different spec-
ifications were tested but yielded very similar results (available upon request). 
Control variables otherwise included the respondent’s highest level of educational at-
tained (below upper secondary education [ISCED 2], apprenticeship or equivalent [ISCED 35], 
general upper secondary education [ISCED 34], vocational tertiary education [ISCED 65], and 
general tertiary education [ISCED 64 and more], number of books in the childhood home (less 
than 10, 11-25, 26-100, 101-200, 201-500, more than 500), age (continuous), gender (female, 
male), immigration status (Swiss native, first generation immigrant, second generation immi-
grant with one parent born abroad, second generation immigrant with both parents born abroad), 
linguistic region of residence (German, French, Italian), if the respondents live in an urban area 
(urban, rural), and the sample the respondent belongs to (1st sample, 2nd sample, 3rd sample, 4th 
sample). Information on the respondents’ occupation was not available in the data set, and alt-
hough egocentrism in occupational prestige ranking could be present, the individual’s occupa-
tional attainment remains a direct consequence of their level of education and should, therefore, 
partly be controlled for. Sensitivity analyses were performed, whereby the labor market situa-
tion, sector of occupation and income category of respondents were introduced as controls (see 
Table A6 in the appendix for detailed results).  
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Main models 
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The results of our first analysis are presented in Figure 4. As can be observed, all other 
things being equal, the effect of the educational requirements of occupations on their rank is 
always negative, meaning that the average rank assigned to occupations is improved when they 
require more years of education in average to be performed, but vary at the same time strongly 
along the political orientation of individuals. More particularly, a strong and statistically signif-
icant polarization is visible in Figure 1, whereby the further respondents are from the middle of 
the political spectrum, the lower the effect of educational requirements on their perception of 
the social prestige of occupations. Our first hypothesis is therefore confirmed. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In order to test the validity of H2a and H2b, we estimated the effect of various dimen-
sions of the skill content of occupations on occupational prestige ranking depending on the 
political orientation of individuals. The results are presented in Table 2. In Models 1-3, interac-
tion effects between the dimensions of the skill content of occupations and the political orien-
tation of respondents are introduced separately, whereas they are included simultaneously in 
Model 1. According to Models 2-3, both the salience in problem-solving and in autonomy affect 
the prestige rank of occupations in a convex manner depending on the political orientation of 
individuals. In other words, the effect of both dimensions along the political orientation of re-
spondents is similar to the one of educational requirements, whereby the further one is from the 
middle of the political spectrum, the less likely one will be influenced by the occupational at-
tribute in question. By contrast, the strength dimension of an occupation will influence occupa-
tional prestige ranking in a concave manner depending on the political orientation of individuals 
(Model 1). Thus, the negative effect of the strength component on the perceived social prestige 
of occupations should be lower in the case of respondents at both extremes of the political 
spectrum. When we now include all variables simultaneously (Model 4), however, only the 
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interaction effect involving the autonomy component of occupations and the political orienta-
tion remains significant.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Looking more closely at the effect of the salience in autonomy on the prestige rank of 
occupations along the political orientation of individuals (Figure 2), we can observe a convex 
relationship, albeit mostly present on the left side of the political spectrum. In other words, the 
autonomy component of occupations is less likely to be valued among radicalized leftist re-
spondents for occupational prestige ranking. Therefore, hypothesis H2b is only partly verified 
here. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 3 displays the effect of educational requirements on occupational prestige rank-
ing by party preference. Here, it appears clearly that the effect of choosing or preferring a PRWP 
does not significantly alleviate the influence of the educational requirements of occupations on 
the perception of the social order. Based on these results, one can therefore affirm that adhering 
to the political program or discourse of a PRWP does not influence the view of the social world, 
hence invalidating both H3a and H3b. Interestingly, however, it appears that respondents choos-
ing the category “other party” are less likely to recognize the training intensiveness of occupa-
tions as an important criteria for the prestige of occupations. In other words, individuals adher-
ing to parties other than the main parties represented in Parliament in Switzerland are less likely 
to accept the rational bases of the social order, all other things, especially the political orienta-
tion, being equal. Therefore, the contestation of the social order remains very marginal at the 
representational level.  
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
It is possible to conclude from these findings that distinct views of the social world are 
not influenced by populist parties but result from the adoption of radicalized political belief 
systems at the margins. These beliefs systems lead to a lower likelihood of acknowledging the 
foundations of the social order and a higher likelihood of valuing occupations because of the 
autonomy they allow at the workplace, all other things being equal.  
  
5. Discussion 
In this paper, we have tested whether the presence of a major PRWP can affect the way 
individuals perceive the social order or whether divergent perceptions are the result of radical-
ized political belief systems. As our results indicate, expressing a preference for a PRWP for 
the next election does not moderate the effect of the educational requirements of occupations 
on their prestige ranking, all other things being equal. Rather, and unsurprisingly, minor parties 
that are not necessarily represented in national political institutions appear to be the source of a 
very marginal contestation of the social order at the representational level. More interestingly, 
expressing views that correspond to either extreme of the political spectrum leads to a lower 
importance of educational requirements and autonomy at the workplace for the perception of 
the social prestige of occupations.  
The increasing complexity of modern societies and labour markets in knowledge econ-
omies might therefore have triggered a strong reaction from the losers and potential losers of 
these developments who, in turn, adopted radicalized belief systems in order to cope with these 
changes. A quick look at the likelihood of radicalization in Switzerland using our data shows 
however different patterns depending on the direction of radicalization (Figure 7). A left radi-
calization is indeed more likely to happen among female individuals living in urban areas of 
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the French-speaking regions, whereas right radicals are more likely to be older male workers 
with either low levels of educational qualifications or vocational training at the upper secondary 
or tertiary level. In both cases, however, the result is a lower acceptation of the institutional 
foundations of the social order. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
We derive two main implications from these findings. First, populist parties, while un-
doubtedly constituting a serious threat to specific groups of individuals, do not appear to un-
dermine support for the foundations of the social order from their electorate despite the explicit 
anti-elitism that characterizes these parties. Second, radicalized individuals might choose, de-
liberately or not, to view the social world in a different manner to cope with their disadvantage 
or fear of the societal transformations that could harm them. This, in turn, is likely to further 
contribute to their exclusion from the predominant societal norms and reproduce their disad-
vantage intergenerationally. More importantly, the main threat for liberal democracies rather 
stems from the transformations in the political belief systems of individuals that probably result 
from structural changes than from the manipulation of the social reality through the political 
discourse. The observed divergent perceptions of the social order, because they are not driven 
by preferences for PRWPs, therefore rather manifest themselves in an informal manner, 
whereby political struggles at the representational level only very marginally affect how indi-
viduals view the social world.  Yet the threat of populism is not to be underestimated. In a world 
where radicalized individuals manage to take control over or bypass major parties to take on 
important roles at either the legislative or executive level, such as the Tea Party and Donald 
Trump in the recent history of the U.S., the liberal democracies as we know them are without a 
doubt under great pressure. In order to face the populist threat, liberal democracies first need to 
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better understand and take the radicalization processes at the societal level seriously before 
hoping to win at the representational level. 
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Endnotes 
1 In modern societies, the mass media have also, by sharing with populist parties issues in a 
similar tone, contributed to the expansion of their domination in the political discourse (Mudde 
2013). 
2 We would like to thank the Swiss Leading House on Economics of Education, a research 
program of the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation and a joint pro-
ject between the University of Bern and University of Zurich, for developing the survey and 
granting us access to the data. We are also very thankful to Maria A. Cattaneo and Stefan 
Denzler for the elaboration of the questions. This survey was conducted by the LINK Institute. 
3 Additional analyses were also conducted by retaining, instead of excluding, those respondents 
who gave the same rank twice to different occupations, and replacing, alternatively, one of both 
redundant ranks by the one missing among the ten that should have been assigned. This resulted 
in two additional distinct samples that were then used to test for the robustness of our results. 
Whether we used the original sample or one of both additional samples, the results remained 
similar (results available upon request). 
4 Because only the level of education was available in the SLFS data set, each level had first to 
be transformed into the corresponding years of education based on official sources (retrieved 
from: http://www.edk.ch/dyn/11586.php). 
5 For more information on the exact methodology, see Eurofound (2016). 
6 Unfortunately, information at a more detailed level of occupational grouping was not available 
in the EWCS and PIAAC databases. 
7 Since Switzerland did not participate in PIAAC and did not include enough observations at 
the occupational level to conduct the appropriate analyses, we were unable to derive indices 
only for Switzerland. This should however not be a problem, as Taylor et al. (2008) have shown 
that the skill content of tasks is rated similarly across countries.  
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8 Some occupations from the ranking list in our main data set were not present in the SLFS data 
as such because of a less detailed variable in the latter. As a result, in some cases, more general 
categories were used to compute the needed variables. 
9 While left parties are expected to question the redistribution of wealth, this should not have 
any influence on their perception of the social order depending on the educational require-
ments of occupations, only on the allocation of labor market resources. 
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Tables  
Table 1. List of occupations to rank depending on the sample 
1st sample 2nd sample 3rd sample 4th sample 
Retail employee Commercial employee 
(EFZ) 
Retail employee Commercial employee 
(EFZ) 
Mechanical Engineer 
(ETH) 
Mechanical Engineer 
(ETH) 
Physicist Physicist 
Electrician Health professional Electrician Health professional 
Sociologist Sociologist Biochemist Biochemist 
Hairdresser Goldsmith Hairdresser Goldsmith 
Actuary Actuary Judge Judge 
Carpenter Graphic designer Carpenter Graphic designer 
Primary school teacher Primary school teacher High school teacher High school teacher 
Care professional Polymechanic Care professional Polymechanic 
Lawyer Lawyer Pediatrician Pediatrician 
Note: occupations with lower educational requirements are highlighted in grey, occupations requiring higher levels 
of education to be performed in white. 
 
Table 2. Impact of the skill content on occupational prestige ranking by political orientation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strength -0.00730*   -0.0643*** 
 (0.00441)   (0.00618) 
Strength x political orientation 0.00213**   -0.00115 
 (0.00106)   (0.00144) 
Strength x political orientation2 -0.000203**   6.19e-05 
 (9.97e-05)   (0.000133) 
Problem-solving  -0.0129  0.0778*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0142) 
Problem-solving x political orientation  -0.00509**  -0.000557 
  (0.00222)  (0.00326) 
Problem-solving x political orientation2  0.000499**  0.000127 
  (0.000212)  (0.000308) 
Autonomy   -0.0558*** -0.340*** 
   (0.00754) (0.0132) 
Autonomy x political orientation   -0.00625*** -0.00736*** 
   (0.00163) (0.00275) 
Autonomy x political orientation2   0.000530*** 0.000545** 
   (0.000154) (0.000259) 
Average years of education -0.247*** -0.192*** -0.165*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0270) (0.0312) (0.0318) 
Average years of education x political orientation -0.0175** -0.0133** -0.0112 -0.0111 
 (0.00767) (0.00678) (0.00773) (0.00729) 
Average years of education x political orientation2 0.00190*** 0.00148** 0.00144** 0.00138** 
 (0.000724) (0.000645) (0.000732) (0.000696) 
     
Observations 50,300 50,300 50,300 50,300 
Number of groups 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Note: Only the interaction effects of interest are shown here.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Impact of the educational requirements on occupational prestige ranking by political 
orientation 
 
Note: See Table A4 (Model 1) in appendix for the full estimates of the model. 
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Figure 2. Impact of the salience in autonomy on occupational prestige ranking by political ori-
entation 
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Figure 3. Impact of the educational requirements on occupational prestige ranking by party 
preference 
 
Note: See Table A4 (Model 2) in appendix for the full estimates of the model. 
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Figure 4. Individual determinants of political radicalization in Switzerland 
 
Note: A left radicalization is defined as having a political orientation lower than 2, a right radicalization a political 
orientation greater than 8. Average marginal effects were obtained after logistic regressions. The reference catego-
ries for the variables shown are: general tertiary education (education), male (gender), German-speaking region 
(linguistic region), rural (area of residence). Control variables include the number of books at home, the immigra-
tion status, and the sample of the respondent. See Table A5 in the appendix for the full estimates of the models.  
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Technical Appendix 
1. Descriptive statistics 
Table A1. Mean value of the occupational attributes 
  Rank Strength Problem-solving Autonomy Years of education 
SE of years of 
education 
Proportion of 
women 
Proportion of 
immigrants Size 
Lawyer 3.06 12 67.8 70.5 20.53 0.13 37% 28%           16 260  
Paediatrician 3.40 29 68.8 58 21.67 0.21 54% 57%           14 683  
Judge 3.44 12 67.8 70.5 19.28 0.38 22% 30%             5 499  
Mechanical engineer 3.70 10 71.4 71.2 18.96 0.16 10% 44%           20 990  
Physicist 4.20 10 71.4 71.2 21.29 0.44 29% 76%             4 739  
Biochemist 4.67 10 71.4 71.2 20.46 0.37 25% 53%             9 751  
Primary school teacher 4.96 17.3 66.8 56.4 16.75 0.09 86% 14%           56 022  
High school teacher 4.97 17.3 66.8 56.4 19.42 0.12 53% 24%           28 091  
Sociologist 5.26 10 71.4 70.5 19.97 0.41 19% 38%             3 374  
Actuary 5.26 12 67.8 71.2 20.35 0.34 39% 43%             4 242  
Care professional 6.05 37.4 55.3 51.3 13.01 0.05 90% 37%         121 968  
Electrician 6.10 35.3 61.8 60.8 14.74 0.12 8% 26%             8 244  
Health professional 6.41 32.3 59 52.2 13.84 0.02 83% 26%         234 639  
Clerk 6.41 13.9 52.0 56.5 13.70 0.17 86% 36%             3 973  
Carpenter 6.45 44 55.1 55.2 14.37 0.16 3% 22%           27 486  
Graphic designer 6.50 10 71.4 71.2 14.57 0.24 31% 24%             9 103  
Goldsmith 6.69 31.5 55 57.2 15.00 0.00 49% 37%             1 355  
Polymechanic 6.80 38.6 55.3 50.2 14.55 0.06 4% 35%           78 659  
Retail employee 7.55 29.2 51.6 53.6 13.49 0.04 68% 35%         169 024  
Hairdresser 8.10 32.5 50.1 53 13.86 0.06 85% 38%           16 002  
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the political orientation of respondents 
Political orientation N Percent 
0 580 1.09 
1 1,100 2.07 
2 4,160 7.82 
3 5,370 10.1 
4 5,780 10.87 
5 16,010 30.11 
6 6,150 11.56 
7 6,800 12.79 
8 5,000 9.4 
9 1,470 2.76 
10 760 1.43 
Total 53,180 100 
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics of the party preference 
Party preference N Percent 
Social democrats (SP) 9,080 17.08 
Greens (Grüne) 3,260 6.13 
Christian democrats (CVP/EVP) 5,440 10.23 
Liberals (FDP) 8,620 16.21 
Green liberals (GLP) 3,810 7.17 
Conservatives (BDP) 3,740 7.03 
Right-wing populists (SVP) 11,290 21.23 
Other right-wing populists 1,710 3.22 
Other 6,220 11.7 
Total 53,170 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Estimates 
Table A4. Full estimates of the main models 
  (1) (2) 
 Main occupational attributes and interactions     
Average years of education -0.212*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0313) 
Average years of education x political orientation -0.0227*** -0.0244*** 
 (0.00781) (0.00786) 
Average years of education x political orientation2 0.00239*** 0.00254*** 
 (0.000737) (0.000762) 
Average years of education x left and centre-right parties Reference category 
 
Average years of education x SVP  0.00313 
  (0.0112) 
Average years of education x other RRWPPs  0.0195 
  (0.0244) 
Average years of education x other  0.0326*** 
  (0.0119) 
Control variables   
Average years of education x below upper secondary education 0.0601*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0139) 
Average years of education x apprenticeship or equivalent 0.0357*** 0.0332*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Average years of education x general upper secondary education 0.00491 0.00502 
 (0.0154) (0.0155) 
Average years of education x vocational tertiary education 0.0212 0.0196 
 (0.0145) (0.0146) 
Average years of education x general tertiary education Reference category 
 
Average years of education x less than 10 books Reference category 
 
Average years of education x 11-25 books -0.0284** -0.0284** 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Average years of education x 26-100 books -0.0435*** -0.0433*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Average years of education x 101-200 -0.0339** -0.0336** 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) 
Average years of education x 201-500 -0.0425** -0.0413** 
 (0.0190) (0.0190) 
Average years of education x more than 500 -0.0638*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Average years of education x Swiss native Reference category 
 
Average years of education x first generation immigrant 0.0230 0.0220 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Average years of education x second generation immigrant with one parent born abroad 0.0136 0.0129 
 (0.0129) (0.0128) 
Average years of education x second generation immigrant with both parents born 
abroad 0.0249 0.0232 
 (0.0199) (0.0199) 
Average years of education x female Reference category 
 
Average years of education x male -0.0297*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00802) 
Average years of education x age -5.05e-05 5.85e-05 
 (0.000286) (0.000290) 
Average years of education x German-speaking region Reference category 
 
Average years of education x French-speaking region 0.0293*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00956) 
Average years of education x Italian-speaking region 0.0492** 0.0441* 
 (0.0226) (0.0238) 
Average years of education x rural Reference category 
 
Average years of education x urban -0.0163* -0.0170** 
 (0.00861) (0.00861) 
Average years of education x 1st sample Reference category 
 
Average years of education x 2nd sample 0.0746*** 0.0745*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Average years of education x 3rd sample -0.0382*** -0.0383*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Average years of education x 4th sample 0.0161 0.0156 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) 
SE of average years of education 0.388*** 0.388*** 
 (0.0651) (0.0652) 
Size in thousands -0.000478 -0.000456 
 (0.000352) (0.000352) 
Size in thousands2 3.69e-07 2.55e-07 
 (1.52e-06) (1.52e-06) 
Proportion of women in % 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.000924) (0.000925) 
Proportion of women in %2 -0.000210*** -0.000210*** 
 (1.02e-05) (1.02e-05) 
Proportion of immigrants in % -0.000534 -0.000529 
 (0.00130) (0.00130) 
Proportion of immigrants in %2 0.000107*** 0.000107*** 
 (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) 
   
Observations 50,300 50,260 
Number of groups 5,030 5,026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
Table A5. Estimates of the likelihood of left or right radicalization depending on individual 
attributes 
  (1) (2) 
 Left radicalization Right radicalization 
      
Below upper secondary education 0.0652 1.046*** 
 (0.269) (0.285) 
Apprenticeship or equivalent -0.111 1.013*** 
 (0.232) (0.251) 
General upper secondary education 0.315 0.277 
 (0.254) (0.328) 
Vocational tertiary education -0.364 0.760** 
 (0.332) (0.296) 
General tertiary education Reference category Reference category 
 
Less than 10 Reference category Reference category 
 
11-25 books -0.310 -0.280 
 (0.302) (0.228) 
26-100 books -0.302 -0.461** 
 (0.290) (0.226) 
101-200 books -0.258 -0.368 
 (0.337) (0.273) 
201-500 books 0.249 -0.368 
 (0.341) (0.320) 
More than 500 books 0.700* -0.994* 
 (0.371) (0.550) 
Swiss native Reference category Reference category 
 
First generation immigrant -0.405 -0.357 
 (0.324) (0.289) 
Second generation immigrant (one parent) 0.262 -0.151 
 (0.227) (0.235) 
Second generation immigrant (both parents) 0.116 -1.861*** 
 (0.362) (0.720) 
Male Reference category Reference category 
 
Female 0.340** -0.930*** 
 (0.164) (0.150) 
Age (standardized) -0.0347 -0.200*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0753) 
German-speaking region Reference category Reference category 
 
French-speaking region 0.534*** 0.121 
 (0.176) (0.174) 
Italian-speaking region -0.0410 0.745** 
 (0.434) (0.321) 
Rural area Reference category Reference category 
 
Urban area 0.581*** -0.215 
 (0.204) (0.148) 
First sample Reference category Reference category 
 
Second sample -0.133 0.224 
 (0.222) (0.192) 
Third sample -0.0974 0.0627 
 (0.219) (0.200) 
Fourth sample -0.140 -0.00501 
 (0.222) (0.202) 
Constant -3.967*** -3.058*** 
 (0.395) (0.346) 
   
Observations 5,318 5,318 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
3. Sensitivity analysis 
The effect of the political orientation and party preference on occupational prestige 
ranking might, however, not be exogeneous as the labour market situation and, more precisely, 
the occupation of respondents could affect both sides of the equation simultaneously. 
Unfortunately, our data set at the individual level does not provide information on the 
occupation of respondents but includes several categorical variables on the labour market 
situation (self-employed, salaried, in training, househusband/-wife, out of employment), the 
sector of employment (20 categories, details available upon request), and the individual 
monthly income (less than CHF 6,000, between CHF 6,001 and CHF 10,000, and more than 
CHF 10,000). These variables were introduced in the previously discussed models in addition 
to the other variables. The results are visible in Table A6, in which Models 1 and 2 are the base 
models, models 3 and 4 new estimation of the base models including the labour market 
situation, and models 5 and 6 new estimation of the base models including the labour market 
situation, the sector of employment and the income. Despite a loss in statistical significance in 
the case of the interaction effects between the educational requirements of occupations and the 
political orientation of individuals in Models 4 and 6 (the lack of significance in the latter model 
being due to the much smaller sample excluding individuals without employment), the main 
results remain similar across the different specifications. Our main findings appear therefore to 
be reliable and not prone to any endogenous bias resulting from the omission of important 
controls.
 
Table A6. Sensitivity analyses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indpendent variables and interactions       
Average years of education -0.215*** -0.132*** -0.211*** -0.116*** -0.0920 -0.0902 
 (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0664) (0.0618) 
Average years of education x political orientation -0.0244*** -0.0111 -0.0242*** -0.0114 -0.0325*** -0.0150 
 (0.00786) (0.00729) (0.00799) (0.00739) (0.0111) (0.0107) 
Average years of education x political orientation2 0.00254*** 0.00138** 0.00254*** 0.00140** 0.00329*** 0.00135 
 (0.000762) (0.000696) (0.000771) (0.000703) (0.00107) (0.00101) 
Average years of education x left and centre-right 
parties 
Reference 
category 
 
Reference 
category 
 
Reference 
category 
 
    
Average years of education x SVP 0.00313  0.00302  -0.0128  
 (0.0112)  (0.0113)  (0.0168)  
Average years of education x other PRWPs 0.0195  0.0213  0.0226  
 (0.0244)  (0.0246)  (0.0394)  
Average years of education x other 0.0326***  0.0332***  0.0472***  
 (0.0119)  (0.0120)  (0.0177)  
Strength  -0.0643***  -0.0599***  -0.0519*** 
  (0.00618)  (0.00695)  (0.0118) 
Strength x political orientation  -0.00115  -0.00107  0.00198 
  (0.00144)  (0.00146)  (0.00209) 
Strength x political orientation2  6.19e-05  4.97e-05  -0.000234 
  (0.000133)  (0.000135)  (0.000192) 
Problem-solving  0.0778***  0.0736***  0.102*** 
  (0.0142)  (0.0155)  (0.0261) 
Problem-solving x political orientation  -0.000557  -0.000823  0.00377 
  (0.00326)  (0.00328)  (0.00454) 
Problem-solving x political orientation2  0.000127  0.000151  -0.000337 
  (0.000308)  (0.000310)  (0.000424) 
Autonomy  -0.340***  -0.337***  -0.317*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.0142)  (0.0252) 
Autonomy x political orientation  -0.00736***  -0.00663**  -0.00939** 
  (0.00275)  (0.00278)  (0.00422) 
Autonomy x political orientation2  0.000545**  0.000486*  0.000901** 
  (0.000259)  (0.000262)  (0.000391) 
       
Additional controls at the individual level       
Labour market situation   X X X X 
Sector     X X 
Income     X X 
       
Observations 50,260 50,300 49,730 49,770 24,410 24,430 
Number of groups 5,026 5,030 4,973 4,977 2,441 2,443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Note: Only the interaction effects of interest are shown here.  
 
